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ABSTRACT
The liberalisation of the telecommunication industry in Africa, and the
further development of the region’s physical infrastructure was accompanied
by the further development of Africa’s information, communication and
technology infrastructure. Competition within the industry stimulated heavy
economic investment in other sectors of the economy. The outcome of
liberalisation also included the establishment of community-based structures
that continue to enable communities to manage their own development and
gain access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in an
unprecedented manner. The telecommunication infrastructure further
stimulated the fast development of other related services, for example, ecommerce and mobile commerce (m-commerce), e-government, internet
banking, mobile banking etcetera. Latest reports and statistics disclose that in
Africa m-commerce is set to even overtake the development of e-commerce,
through the popular use and penetration of mobile telephony whilst ecommerce development is constrained by difficulties in rolling out speedily
fixed telephone lines. These new methods of communication have so
intensified that there is hope that further penetration of mobile telephony
would leap-frog economic growth and development in Africa, especially in
rural communities. Therefore, innovations and investment in ICT’s are
changing the world in a number of ways, resulting in a globally connected
digital economy. However, there are regulatory challenges that need to be
addressed as a matter of urgency. Certain sections of the continent’s
population, especially those in rural areas, have very limited access to ICT’s.
This prevents them from exploiting opportunities offered by ICT’s. The main
barriers to ICT access relate to inadequate regimes and their supporting legal
frameworks, high cost of internet access, connectivity problems, the lack of
technical skills to support maintenance and low number of computers with
internet connectivity at schools, libraries and other public places. In this
paper such challenges are identified and further reforms suggested. The
ultimate recommendation is the one that states that a SADC
telecommunication independent regulatory agency be established,
independent of any government ministry, though consulting with a SADC
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Ministerial Council. Already, some countries in West Africa have developed
a harmonized regulatory framework designed to integrate the Acts covering
ICT markets in the sub-region and to keep policy and regulatory frameworks
in line with the constant evolution of technologies, applications and services.
1. INTRODUCTION
The information communication technologies (ICTs), have become enablers
of change though on their own do not create transformation but can best be
seen as facilitators of change, innovation and creativity. The most important
economic impact of the spread and use of ICTs is indirect and is through
transforming the way individuals, business and other parts of the society
work, communicate, and interact. In other words, ICTs unleash the creative
potential embodied in people. Apart from the contribution the ICTs industry
makes to economic growth and development, it also acts as a catalyst in
promoting qualitative improvements in other sectors of the economy.
Reasons for that are that ICTs are generally important intermediates in
production and in the infrastructure on which the information age is being
built. It is therefore contended that for Africa, ICTs definitely have the
potential to strengthen economic growth and to be used to create new
markets, new technological applications for collaboration, and new methods
and tools for scientific and technological research. The ICTs not only
facilitate information exchange, but actually deepen the change process,
creating new modes of sharing ideas, and reducing the costs of collecting and
analyzing information. ICTs are about information flowing faster, more
generously, and less expensively throughout the planet. As a result,
knowledge is becoming an important factor in the economy, more important
than raw materials, capital, labour, or exchange rates. Report of the
Commission for Science and Technology for Development (2003) states that
“ICTs refer to technologies people use to share, distribute, gather information
and communicate, through computers and interconnected computer networks.
They are a complex and varied set of goods, applications and services used
for producing, distributing, processing, transforming information, including
telecoms, TV and radio broadcasting, hardware and software, computer
services and electronic media.” The present attitude of Africa’s governments
to the ICT industry has since changed. There is a growing consensus that
national monopolies have become inefficient, costly, and sometimes corrupt
and therefore must ultimately be opened to private competition if the industry
is to flourish. Overall, the consensus seems to be that properly used ICTs
could reduce poverty; empower people; build capacities, skills and networks;
inspire new governance mechanisms and reinforce popular participation at all
levels. The range of applications seem limitless; from electronic commerce
(e-commerce), mobile commerce (m-commerce), to the empowerment of
communities, women and youth; from the promotion of good governance and
decentralization, to advocacy programmes, including the observance of
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human rights; from long-distance education to tele-health and environmental
monitoring.
The process of liberalisation is now being pursued within the World Trade
Organization’s General Agreement on Trade and Services and Annexures
thereto. Building the required infrastructure is a daunting problem in Africa,
but these challenges, under an appropriate regulatory regime, can be turned
around into opportunities. Business players and stakeholders in the
telecommunications industry are generally well-resourced multinational
companies which are notorious for using their dominant economic influence
to undermine the natural development of infant industry. It is for this reason
that in this paper a proposal is made for the establishment of a strong
independent, effective, efficient, and well-funded communications regulatory
authority for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as a
basis and pioneer for a continental similar project. The aim is to have a
regulatory regime that will monitor and coordinate the activities of economic
players and protect consumers and weak government alike. A catalyst for
economic stability, levelling of the playing ground, providing an environment
conducive to investment, and helping governments and other stakeholders
manage their ICTs.
Section 1 is a brief discussion of the WTO framework on rules and regulation
that guide the service industry, especially the telecommunications sector.
Section 2 is a brief survey and an account of progress in the liberalization of
the telecommunications sector in Africa and, generally, the dismantling of
State monopoly utilities. Privatization issues are also raised and analysed.
The future role of mobile telephony industry is particularly included in
Section 3, because of its advantages over fixed telephone lines which are
costly to roll-out in a continent known for its rugged terrain. Besides mobile
telephony has overtaken fixed lines in Africa, and its penetration is fast
growing, even reaching out to remote rural areas. In section 4, the
competitive environment is analysed more especially as it is influenced by
the presence and operation of foreign corporate groups. Concerns have been
expressed about their influence and likely dominance in an industry that is
capital intensive and employs highly skilled personnel. Section 5 represents
the ultimate recommendation of this paper, the establishment of a SADC
Communications Regulatory Authority – SADC-CA. Section 6 is the
Conclusion.

2. THE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY: THE WTO
CONTEXT
The liberalisation processes in the telecommunications cannot just take place
outside the WTO framework in terms of the General Agreement on Trade in
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Services (GATS). Of special importance are the second and third preambular
paragraphs of GATS which state:
Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for
trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means
of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing countries;
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of
liberalization of trade in services through successive rounds of
multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the interests of all
participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at securing an overall
balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect to national
policy objectives …
The trade in services falls broadly into four categories under the WTO
umbrella:1 those services which are supplied across national borders, those
services consumed abroad; those services for which a commercial presence is
required, and those provided through the presence of a natural person. The
dramatic rise in trade in all of these categories since the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) reflects liberalisation in capital markets
and freeing of restrictions on capital flows which have increased the ability of
large multi-national corporations to enter countries and provide services
directly.2
Before this development, and in telecommunications industry, all the three
standard forms of international growth, i.e. exporting, direct foreign
investment and non equity agreements, were barred for a long time by the
institutional set up of national markets of this industry.3 Even international
telecommunications were treated as an extension of domestic
telecommunications with tight heavily regulated international oligopoly
established.4 As observed by Antonelli, the network of each country was
managed just by one firm, heavily regulated, and most importantly, with a
strong "national" character. Cristiano Antonelli further states that in almost
all the States representing developed or developing countries,
telecommunications services were managed either by state-owned companies
or directly by public agencies.5 Today what was once a regulatory area, the
1

See Angus Henderson, Iain Gentle & Elise Ball, ‘WTO Principles and Telecommunications
in Developing Nations: Challenges and Consequences of Accession’ 29 (2005)
Telecommunications Policy, 205–221
2
See generally Cristiano Antonelli, ‘Technological Change and Multinational Growth in
International telecommunications Services’, 10 Review of Industrial Organization, 161-162.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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telecommunications industry has become a market access issue under the
GATS and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This also,
increasingly reflects technological advances in the easy provision of services
across borders.
Part II of the GATS establishes the general obligations and disciplines to be
observed by all WTO member states.6 Amongst those likely to have a direct
impact on telecommunications regulatory regimes are the following:
•

MFN—most favoured nation treatment which is established in
Article II,

•

legal and regulatory transparency as required by Article III,

•

impartial regulation and access to procedures for review under
Article VI,

•

the obligation under Article IX to work toward the elimination
of business practices that may distort competition, and

•

the obligation on members to enter into negotiations regarding
subsidies.

Countries make specific commitments, limitations and conditions pursuant to
Part III of GATS, in respect of market access,7 national treatment,8 and
additional commitments.9 It is particularly in terms of Articles XVI and XVII
that specific commitments are made by countries in the telecommunications
sector in relation to the opening of competition and issue of additional
licences (market access) and foreign investment (national treatment),
respectively.
GATS was initially opposed by most governments in the developing
countries, as there was a perception that in future there would be dramatic
increase in the provision of often essential services by foreign entities.10
These fears were justified on several grounds, amongst which were, that any
such agreement would threaten the right of governments to maintain public
services, that liberalisation of services markets under the WTO would
effectively mean deregulation, and that foreign investment in the supply of
services would retard the development of the relevant infant local service
industry. The developing countries had argued that in the service industry
sector, developed countries were already enjoying comparative advantage
over developing countries, in a service industry sector which was capital

6

See Bobjoseph Mathew, The WTO Agreements on Telecommunications (2003) , 81-82.
See WTO, GATS, Article XVI.
8
Ibid. Article XVII.
9
Ibid, Article XVIII.
10
See Mathew, note 6 supra,45-46
7
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intensive needing highly skilled personnel.11 Obviously, in view of the fact
that the governments of developing countries typically face tight fiscal
constraints, there was fear about the dissipation of revenues through foreign
competition.
According to the World Trade Organization, the telecommunications services
are a global market worth over US$ 1.5 trillion in revenue.12 The
participation of African countries, especially, the least developed countries
(LDCs), in this sector is very crucial as it has foreign direct investments
implication in billions of US dollars. The mobile services account for roughly
40 per cent of this market, while mobile subscribers worldwide currently
outnumber the use of fixed telephone lines by more than two to one.13 Since
1998, the market has witnessed far-reaching changes, with the introduction of
competition into a sector that was once principally a monopoly.14
Commitments in telecommunications services were first made during the
Uruguay Round (1986-94), mostly in value-added services. In post-Uruguay
Round negotiations (1994-97), WTO members negotiated on basic
telecommunications services. Since then, commitments have been made by
new members, upon accession to the WTO, or unilaterally at any time.
According to the WTO report, a total of 108 WTO members have made
commitments to facilitate trade in telecommunications services.15 These
commitments include the establishment of new telecoms companies, foreign
direct investment in existing companies and cross-border transmission of
telecoms services. Out of this total, 99 members have committed to extend
competition in basic telecommunications (e.g. fixed and mobile telephony,
real-time data transmission, and the sale of leased-circuit capacity).16 In
addition, 82 WTO members have committed to the regulatory principles
spelled out in the “Reference Paper”, a blueprint for sector reform that largely
reflects “best practice” in telecoms regulation.17
Telecommunications, like other services, are included in the services
negotiations, which began in January 2000. In the current Doha Round of
negotiations, additional market opening as well as the binding of recent
reforms (i.e. a commitment not to increase a rate of duty beyond an agreed
level) in telecommunications is the objective of many of the negotiating
11

Ibid.
See http://www.wto.org last visited 5 May 2009.
13
Ibid.
14
See Amin Alhassan, ‘Telecom regulation, the Postcolonial State, and Big Business: The
Ghanaian Experience’ West Africa Review (2003),
http://www.westafricareview.comvol4.1.alhassan,html.
15
See http://www.wto.org TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: LIST OF
COMMITMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS Telecommunications commitments and exemptions
16
Ibid.
17
See http://www.wto.org last visited 10May 2009-05-12.
12
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requests made by WTO members to their trading partners. As of July 2008,
39 governments had made offers to improve their existing commitments or to
commit for the first time in the telecommunications sector.
All in all, the trade rules that apply to telecommunications services include
the framework articles of the GATS,18 which contain the principles for trade
in all services. In addition, the GATS also contains an Annex on
Telecommunications. This provides guarantees for reasonable access to and
use of public telecommunications, in a given market, by suppliers of all
services benefiting from commitments scheduled by the member concerned.
The Reference Paper (RP) is a set of regulatory principles that is legally
binding for those WTO governments which have committed to it by
appending the document, in whole or in part, to their schedules of
commitments. There is therefore no telecoms regulatory regime that can dare
ignore the contents of the RP document.
3. PRIVATIZATION AND THE LIBERALISATION IN AFRICA
As have been stated earlier, infrastructure industries have traditionally been
monopolies, owned and operated by the public sector. Post-colonial Africa
was no exception as it inherited holus bolus these models as for much of the
20th century, infrastructure services in all countries were provided by stateowned utilities that were vertically integrated.19 In their initial stages these
models produced some desirable results, later however, their service delivery
ultimately led to serious problems for the public interest. The problems
included underinvestment, in large part caused by under-pricing; low
productivity; poor service quality; long queues and large portions of the
population without access to basic services; lack of transparency; and
damaging political interference in the operations of these infrastructure
entities.
The primary aim of any liberalisation process is the achievement of effective
competition. Black et al state that the theoretical justification for privatisation
and deregulation comes partly from the potential efficiency gains to be had
from a change in ownership and in market structure.20 That in the
telecommunications industry specifically, the justification comes also partly
from a technological revolution which has effectively removed the need for
state ownership and protection.21 The other gains from privatisation stem
from the sale of state assets which, coupled with the broadening of the tax
18

See WTO, GATS, Articles II-XV.
See generally Calvin Djiofack-Zebaze & Alexander Keck, ‘Telecommunication Services in
Africa: The Impact of WTO Commitments and Unilateral Reform in Sector Performance and
Economic Growth’ Vol 37 No 5 (2009) World Development, 919-940.
20
See P A Black, PO Baird & A Heese, ‘Ownership and Competition in South African
Telecommunications’ Vol 65 (2) (1997) South African Journal of Economics,104-111.
21
Ibid.
19
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base, may help governments to break out of their fiscal deadlocks and
improve their ability to provide public goods and services to their respective
constituencies.22 Black et al further identify efficiency benefits which derive
primarily from the nature of principal-agent relationships which are normally
associated with a system of private ownership and competitive markets.23
Under such a regime the principal shareholders will see to it that appropriate
incentive schemes and monitoring procedures are put into place at all levels
of management, thus ‘minimising practices of moral hazard and adverse
selection and setting conditions for maintaining high levels of operational
…efficiency.’24
Black et al further argue that technological progress (or 'dynamic' efficiency)
is likewise, likely to be more advanced under private ownership and
competition than under a system of state control, since under the former
system managers will more readily adopt new technologies aimed at cutting
costs and boosting profits.25 Quoting from previous issues of the Economist,
Black et al state that with regard to the telecommunications industry, it is
perhaps the technological revolution itself that has triggered the world-wide
restructuring and privatisation of the industry.26 They opine that technological
changes have affected virtually the whole of the industry, and are largely
responsible for the introduction of optical fibres, digitised exchanges, mobile
and cellular telephones, personal wireless handiphones, and electronic mail.
They conclude that these changes have effectively broken down entry barriers
and encouraged governments to liberalise and privatise the industry.27
Finally, Black et al. state that whilst the process of privatization is still
ongoing, it is generally necessary to impose price controls on dominant
operators and, in a network industry, to allow new entrants, at least initially,
to access the infrastructure of the incumbent.28 This strategy was adopted by
the South African government. The result was that a range of policy decisions
on the part of the South African Government further entrenched Telkom’s
dominance and restricted the ability of competitors to access bottleneck
facilities in a manner which would have enabled them to compete.29 These

22

Ibid.
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
See THE ECONOMIST (1993). "Selling the State", 21-27 August;THE ECONOMIST
(1993). "Utilities & Telecoms: The Third Wire", 21-28 January;THE ECONOMIST (1993).
"Asian Telecoms: Private Numbers", 30 September-6 October.
27
Ibid.
28
See Gershon Sibinda, ‘Regulatory Environment Analysis in the South African
telecommunications Industry’ Vol 76(2) 2008 South Africa Journal of Economics, 213-227.
29
See generally South African Telecommunications Sector Performance Review 2006, Steve
Esselaar, Alison Gillwald & Christoph Stork (eds), LINK Centre Public Policy Research Paper
23
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included the restriction placed on value-added service (VANS) providers as
to where they could obtain facilities. It has now been acknowledged that the
unbundling of the local loop and opening international gateways (such as the
SAT-3 undersea cable), to operators are pro-competitive interventions that
have proven successful elsewhere. However when it comes to Telkom similar
measures have not been imposed in South Africa.30 Unfortunately, alongside
a market structure wherein competition is inhibited, is ICASA, a regulatory
authority which is equipped with such inadequate resources that will not
enable it control Telkom’s retail and access prices.31 The general observation
is that the South African telecommunications market is presently
characterised by very limited competition and a regulator without the means
necessary to control the dominant operator.32 The result is that prices of
telecommunications services are extremely high in relation to other
jurisdictions. African governments have also given reasons for market access
restrictions. Among others was the desire to give incumbents time to prepare
for competition, for examples: Telkom in South Africa (fixed); Ethiopia
(mobile & fixed); Cameroon (fixed). There was secondly the consideration to
increase government revenue from privatization and the argument that
exclusive rights were necessary to attract strategic investment, and to reserve
exclusive rights in order to allow for the provision of universal service.
The challenge is for governments to develop capacity within their public
service. Capacity building and training projects will enable governments
analyse telecommunications market conditions; set policy frameworks; draw
up, negotiate and enforce contracts; regulate monopolies; coordinate, finance
and support producers; enable community self-provision; protect consumers
and provide them with information on their options and remedies. There must
however be realization that privatization is not the end of government
participation but rather a new beginning. It is against this backdrop of
complexities that this paper proposed the establishment of a regional
telecommunications independent regulatory agency.
Many countries in Africa have completed the initial stages of reforming their
telecommunication sector. Others are just initiating the process. All African
countries seek to turn the digital divide into a digital opportunity and address
the emerging broadband gap. Creating an enabling environment to attract
investment is essential to meeting this goal. Policies being introduced deal
with issues of privatization, establishment of national regulatory authorities,
and enabling environment for competition. In 2007, Connect Africa reported
that, at least, some thirty African economies (or 55 per cent) had at least
No. 8 Learning Information Networking and Knowledge (LINK) Centre Graduate School of
Public and Development Management Witwatersrand University.
30
See ITU, CASE STUDY, BROADBAND THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1-27.
31
See Sibinda, note 28 supra, 225-227.
32
Ibid.
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partially privatized their incumbent telecoms operator.33 It has been observed
that privatization sends a strong signal that policy decisions and regulations
will be fair to all in the market place. The Connect Africa Background Paper
opines that ‘fostering a level playing-field is more likely if the State avoids
being both a market player (i.e. owner or part-owner of the incumbent) and a
referee at the same time.”34 In the same Paper, it is reported that forty-five
African economies (or eighty-three percent) have established a
telecommunication/ICT regulatory authorities, with sixteen created since
2000.35 However though in Africa some effective regulatory bodies have
been identified, other continent’s regulatory authorities lack the power to
enforce pro-competitive regulatory decisions and many more require capacity
building initiatives in order to become more effective regulators.
Rolling out fixed telephone lines is costly and few SADC countries can
afford from their meagre resources such massive physical infrastructure. The
capital is scarce, moreover savings are generally poor and the tax base very
narrow. Foreign direct investment and policies related thereto should be
specially addressed by a specialized body not an individual State
communications department. As stated by Lydon and Williams, higher
investment is central to achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty
eradication.36 Such higher investment can be achieved through FDI flows. In
their study, Lydon and Williams, focused in particular on the relationship
between FDI flows into developing countries and the penetration of
telecommunications network in the recipient country. They found that both
fixed and mobile communications networks ‘are positively linked with
inward FDI.’37FDI is also associated with privatization in the African market
for mobile telephony.
4. MOBILE TELEPHONY AND PRIVATIZATION
Currently, mobile telephony is the most important mode of
telecommunications in developing countries. It has been observed, that while
internet access has become a reality for many businesses and public
institutions, and for individuals with higher levels of education and income,
for the vast majority of the low-income population, mobile telephony is likely
to be the sole tool connecting them to the information society in the short to

33

See Connect Africa, ‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Investment’, Background Paper,
Session 5 (20070 Connect Africa Summit, 20-30 October 2007.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
See Reamonn & Mark Williams, COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES no 58, 2nd quarter
2005, 43.
37
Ibid.
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medium term.38 Privatization has been brisk in Africa with regard to the
liberalization of the mobile telephone industry.39 Around 1996, telephone
density in Africa was under one subscriber per 1000 inhabitants and it was
thought that the region’s development potential would be severely curtailed
for a long time until this low density was reversed. However, by 2001, Africa
reached a historic milestone with a density of one telephone subscriber per
100 inhabitants. The remarkable growth in so short a time has been attributed
to the region’s remarkable economic growth, the doubling of export trade, the
liberalization of telecommunications, and the marriage between African
subscribers to telecommunication services and mobile cellular and pre-paid
card services. The underlying proposition is that, of all ICTs, mobile
telephony has the most immediate potential to stimulate growth in the
developing countries, and especially in Africa, in particular in sectors where
entrepreneurship and access to market information are important factors.
Mobile telephony has real economic consequences, particularly for microentrepreneurs.
The technology and infrastructure prerequisites saw the majority of countries
in Africa deploy GSM-based networks.40 GPRS- and EDGEtechnologies
have also been deployed in some of the comparatively developed mobile
markets. Demand in broadband internet services is very high even though
only few Africans are capable of affording them, making 3G service a viable
business opportunity for mobile operators in the major cities in the continent.
Some of the market players feel that 3G services will fill the void created in
the regions where decent fixed line infrastructure is scarce and subscribers
are unable to access the Internet.41
At least 15 mobile operators have already announced plans of introducing 3G
services including existing networks in South Africa, Egypt and Tanzania and
others planned in Kenya, Namibia and Nigeria. Only 5 percent of subscribers
availed 3G voice and data service by 2006, according to Informa Telecoms
and Media, an industry watcher. The relevance of mobile phones for small
businesses in developing countries was noted in UNCTAD’s Information
Economy Report 2005. The use of mobile telephony in the conduct of
business reduces the costs and increases the speed of transactions. Mobile
connectivity sidesteps some important obstacles to other types of
connectivity. It is not hampered by, among other things, cost and the
remoteness of certain areas.
In Africa, mobile phones have proved so successful that in many cases they
38
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have replaced fixed lines. Almost 56 percent of the sub-Saharan Africa
countries now allow competition in mobile cellular, up from 7 percent in
1995; only six countries lacked cellular services in 2001, compared with 28
in 1995; and 4 of 5 subscribers on the continent use pre-paid mobile service.
Moreover, the growth in mobile cellular services is outstripping fixed
telephone services by geometric proportions. In 2001, mobile cellular
overtook fixed telephone subscribers for the first time, with 28 million
compared to 22 million subscribers. By 2005, there will be 130 million phone
subscribers in the region, 98 million of them mobile cellular subscribers.
There are several reasons for the rapid growth in mobile phone in Africa
market. But the two most important are: first, the limited penetration of fixedlines telephone network, lack of investment, inadequate private-sector
involvement, foreign exchange scarcity (lack of trade), poor management
incentives; second, the prepaid system which has its own advantages - low
operating cost; no credit and less fraud than fixed line.
By 2007, the summary results of mobile telephony penetration in Africa was
represented as follows:42
•

At the end of 2007 there were over 280 million mobile phone
subscribers in Africa, representing a penetration rate of 30.4
percent

•

Africa has become the fastest growing mobile market in the
world with mobile penetration in the region ranging from 30
percent to 100 percent from country to country.

•

Fastest growing markets are in Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt

•

Increased competition as more operators come online in each
country (11 in Nigeria, 4 in Kenya and SA, 3 in Egypt and
Morocco)

•

Pre-paid subscriptions account for nearly 95 percent of total
mobile subscriptions in the region.

•

The Democratic Republic of Congo, population 60 million, has
10,000 fixed telephones but more than a million mobile phone
subscribers.

•

In Chad, the fifth-least developed country, mobile phone usage
jumped from 10,000 to 200,000 in three years.

42
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5. COMPETITION AND FOREIGN CONTROL
There is fear that in future, the pioneer telecommunications service providers
in the mobile telephony industry, may be vulnerable to international control,
international sabotage, or to predatory economic practices. This in spite of the
fact that the initial boon in mobile cellular telecommunications services in the
continent was initiated by a new breed of pan-African mobile companies.
These companies were in the first place not state-owned nor large
multinationals as was previously speculated. This should be viewed against
the background that, virtually in every country there is either lax regulation or
weak regulatory framework for protecting both the new market providers and
domestic consumers of cellular telecommunications services. The infant
domestic telecom industry might not withstand the dominant multinational
corporations economic power of competition. Multinationals in developed
countries have huge advantages in technological and marketing capability,
will enjoy comparative advantages over local industries. These multinationals
will, once they enter the market, displace local operators and put them out of
business as SADC telecom markets become attractive. The emergent players
in the private telecommunications markets in the SADC region are not only
small in market capitalization, but are failing to recognize the advantages of
economies of scale. Players in these markets have not so far realized
synergies by cooperating with one another. Instead, they are presently
engaged in highly predatory and ruinous competition that leave them exposed
and vulnerable to larger international entities who are making inroads into the
SADC and Africa market. Eventually, the lucrative profits and revenues
envisaged in the sector will in future accrue to foreign shareholders. Another
observation made is that where strategic alliances are being made between
providers of domestic mobile cellular services and foreign investors, the
locus of control and strategic opportunities for both dominating and
disrupting the markets of sub-Sahara Africa countries are located either in the
United States, Holland, England, or the Middle East. And in some of these
cases, the foreign partners have strategic alliances with military, industrial,
and intelligence services in their host nations. For example, the major players,
along with their home country affiliations in the African market include: RSA
Security (Dutch/U.S.A.); MTN or Mobile Telephone Networks (South
Africa); ECONET (Zimbabwe); PM Tech (U.S.A./UK); Oracle (U.S.A.);
Microsoft (U.S.A.); and Orascom (Egypt).
The density of integration of the African communications networks with the
foreign operations is as remarkable as it is invisible to all but the most critical
observers. First, there is the element of platform interconnectivity, as in the
joining of the West African Submarine Cable (WASC) system with the South
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African Far East (SAFE) cable system.43 SAFE is submarine fibre optic cable
measuring 28,000 kilometres and linking Europe to Africa and Asia, designed
to carry telephone, multimedia and internet traffic. This huge project, costing
USD640 million, was financed by a consortium of 36 international operators
including France Telecom, which invested USD96 million or 15 percent of
the total. The SAT-3/WASC/Safe submarine cable will enable broadband
telecommunication services in particular to be strengthened.44 Also, the West
Africa Cable System (WACS) will boost broadband capacity and could cut
comparatively high Internet tariffs in Africa's biggest economy, which has
relied on a single international cable controlled for years by Telkom.
What is curious about this SAFE system is that it is anchored in Kochi,
Kerala (India). But its operations and the profile of the services it provides
have significant implications for Africa and many non-African countries.
West Africa is also currently served by two cables (Atlantis II and SAT-3).
Besides, seven more are planned; namely, Glo-1, Main-1, WAFS, Infinity,
Uhurunet, AWCC/WACS, ACE. The investment would either be into the
WACS cable which would run to London, or more likely the ACE (Africa
Coast to Europe) cable planned by France Telecom which would run via
Cape Verde and Portugal to France.45
With this type of integration, cable and satellite services have been linked
between Far East Asia, Africa, and Europe, with connection points in India,
Durban, the Reunion Island, Mauritius, Malaysia, Melkbosstrand (S. Africa),
Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Senegal, the Canary
Islands, Spain, and Portugal. The system, with its controls in India, already
has 42 telecommunications companies located in 35 countries using its
services.
Platform interconnectivity via computer and database-linked systems such as
those provided by the U.S.-based Microsoft and the Oracle corporations,
illustrates, the now dominance of foreign telecom operating entities in Africa.
Although they provide no visible mobile cellular telecommunications
services, they control and virtually own the hardware operating systems
43

See further http//wwwglobalinsight.com, where it is stated that Portugal Telecom and its
subsidiary Cape Verde Telecom have reportedly invested US$50 million in a West African
submarine cable WASC), which will connect Cape Verde and Portugal. According to Macau
Hub, the investment is part of an international consortium. The report says that the cable will
run along the west coast of Africa and have landing points in Cape Verde, Portugal, and
London; it is due to become operational in 2011. Besides Cape Verde Telecom, in which
Portugal Telecom owns a 40% stake, the operator also has subsidiaries in Morocco, Guinea
Bissau, Sao Tome & Principe, Angola and Namibia. According to Macau Hub, Portugal
Telecom plans to use the cable for connectivity to some of its African operations as well as its
own Internet connectivity to the hub in London. Cape Verde Telecom had an international
bandwidth of 24 Mbps in 2006 and 68 Mbps in 2007
44
See SAFE http://www.safe-sat3.co,.za
45
Ibid.

86

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4)
platforms, the routing networks, the databases, and the appliances that run
and remotely monitor every computer and database operation in the region.
Of late, Microsoft, has struck strategic partnership with PM Tech Holdings
for software solutions development, networking, database management, esecurity, and IT (information technology) consulting.46 PM Tech already has
extensive holdings in the petroleum, financial, telecommunications sectors of
Nigeria, Cameroon, the Congo, Swaziland, Botswana, and it is rapidly
expanding its operations throughout West Africa. Also, it is targeting Kenya,
Namibia, Mozambique, and Zambia. Oracle Corporation has already set up
shop in Abidjan as a regional hub and with its business applications suites
and networking solutions already controls 80 percent of all public
administration projects in West Africa, all banking operations,
telecommunications services, and is seeking to establish strategic
partnerships with companies with defense industry links.47 RSA Security, a
major South-African military defense industry subsidiary at one point, has
Dutch and US affiliations with headquarters in Bedford, MA.48 The
company’s expertise includes electronic security solutions and e-security
intelligence and it has established strategic partnership with SchlumbergerSema, a global information technology services company, to provide smart
card-based solutions that interface with RSA Security smart cards operations
in banking and other services throughout Africa. RSA Security already boasts
12 million customers worldwide. In 2001, e-security solutions accounted for
100% of RSA Security revenues. In 2000, the company reported a gross
income of $280.2 million and an after-tax profit of $205.8 million. Econet, a
small Zimbabwe wireless company, secured in 2002 contracts worth $50
million to deliver international commercial satellite services to customers,
providing linkage between African countries and Europe, allowing Econet to
gain European footprints, but with heavy reliance and dependence on UK
companies that provide the gateway into Europe. Then, as a last there is
Orascom as a last example. Orascom is an Egyptian company, with 57
percent of the stock held by the Sawaris family of Egypt, presently operating
in 18 Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan Africa countries, with a mobile
cellular link hub in Belgium.49 Orascom’s core business activities are
extensive and touch on a wide swath of sub-Sahara Africa life -- IT,
computer-related services, hotels, medical, dental, hospital supplies,
construction and petroleum services.
These inroads by foreign capital, now translating into multibillions of US
dollars, will eventually swallow infant industry in the SADC region in the
46
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whole of the telecommunications sector. Weak, economically
underdeveloped, sometimes corrupt States in the SADC region might never
have power to coordinate and monitor the dangerous and negative activities
of these companies in a sector industry which is by its nature, capital and
resource intensive, and deploying highly skilled personnel in all its divisions.
6. SADC COMMUNICATIONS INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in
existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majorityruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating
development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then
apartheid South Africa. The founding Member States are: Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The present States membership include: Angola,
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The need for the establishment of an independent regulatory authority for
telecommunications in the SADC region is motivated by the existence of a
number of factors political, economical, developmental, and all in the ever
globalizing world. One of the central objectives of SADC is to forge links
among Member States to create a genuine and equitable regional integration
and promote advancement of its citizens, thereby raising the quality and
standard of life and, consequently, alleviating poverty. The enabling factors
to achieve this goal include: co-operation in infrastructure development,
coordination of sectoral plans and programmes, promotion of investment and
production, and the development of indigenous contents, are still being
harnessed.
The telecommunications has been identified by SADC members as one of the
key infrastructures that still has to progress to the desirable standard. A large
scale and advanced telecommunications infrastructure in SADC, capable of
delivering telecommunication services, has been recognised as a pre-requisite
for economic growth. Therefore, the availability of adequate communications
links within both individual countries, the region and internationally is
accepted by stakeholders as an essential instrument to facilitate intra-SADC
and extra-SADC trade, leading to socio-economic development. It has
however been acknowledged in the region and confirmed through various
studies, including those of the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), that there is a serious inadequacy of info-communications capacity.
As the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital intensifies, the
telecommunications sector is certainly going to be capitalized in massive
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proportions and become complex to regulate. In place must the therefore be
an independent, efficient, effective, transparent, well-funded and well staffed,
technologically endowed regional regulatory regime. A regime capable of
engaging and reining the power and economic dominance of multination
companies and other powerful stakeholders in the ICT sector, in particular the
Telkom corporate group structure.
There are a variety of explanations for the adoption of regulatory statutes or
treaties, most of which amount to justification. Regulatory legal regimes can
be distinguished according to function. Sunstein asserts that many statutes in
this regard are responding to market failures.50 For example, in the field of
regulation against a monopolistic business practice, regulatory statutes are,
least controversially, a response to the risks of monopoly. Regulation may be
a response to collective action problems, coordination questions and
transaction costs.51 Sunstein states that it is a familiar point that individually
rational private behaviour may produce collective or public irrationality.52
For instance, if everyone acts in his/her self-interest, serious harm will
sometimes result. Instances in this regard involve public or collective goods
which are characterised by two features, non-rivalrous consumption and
non-excludability. In cases of this nature, each person acting rationally is
tempted to ‘free ride’ while others pay, the consequence being that the good
would not be provided for all. Sunstein states further that government
regulation is needed to eliminate the free-rider problem and to ensure the
public goods will be created.53 However in this paper I deal with a regulatory
agency of a special kind, an independent regulatory agency (IRA), on
telecommunications dealing with ICT services and goods and personnel with
an ICT infrastructure. A regime that owes its creation to a collective group of
independent who have undertaken to shed part of their sovereigny to establish
a regulatory regime that is not accountable to any particula State. The
strategy is to avopid capture by any State member or a particular State
Ministry. Opportunities for corruption are immediately eliminated in a sector
valued in trillions of US dollars, and still growing in tandem with the nergy
sector (not discussed here).
Accordingly, in this paper, an IRA is exclusively defined as an agency having
its own powers and responsibilities under public law; whose organizational
structure is separated from government ministries and whose members are
neither directly elected by people nor managed by elected officials. If these
50
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are the minimum requirements that this regional IRA should meet in order to
be counted as really independent, then those agencies which are organized as
units of ministries, organic organs of government or within the bureaucracy
should be excluded from the analysis, because these latter referred to
formations are exercising state power under the direct control of ministers
and the civil service. Moreover, their powers and institutional designs are not
independent from the government. Immediately therefor Telkom (SA) and
other State utilities in the telecommunications sector are excluded from
participating in this envisioned regional IRA, and this includes ICASA.
This envisaged regional IRA structure will also have intergovernmental
features, though not monopolised by a single parliament (or ministries) of
participating States in that there will be regular consultative summit with
State Ministers in charge of ICT and infrastructure. It must be understood that
ICT products are cross-cutting, multi-media and defy geographical
boundaries. Added to these factors are the magnitude, technical complexity
and the variability of the material or entities being regulated. There is also a
need to remove these matters from direct political control and to follow a
quasi-judicial mode of procedure that includes enforcement. As stated by
Barry Barton,54 regulation (independent regulatory authority) often pursues
multiple processes and is also a matter that cannot be left to the courts of law.
Barton also distinguishes the relative roles these two institutions (courts and
regulatory agencies) play. He states that,55
regulatory agencies must often develop and implement policy
consistently with other public agencies, while the courts are independent.
Regulation is generally a long-term engagement with an area activity,
while the judicial process is one of deciding each matter that is brought to
court. Regulation usually looks ahead, while the courts are usually
concerned with applying the law to past events. The focus of regulation is
the management of an area of activity, as applied by law, rather that the
determination of rights under the law…
Barton also offers a cogent argument why on the other hand regulation is not
left in the hands of the executive. He states,
[i]n the United States in particular, regulatory agencies were established
because it was necessary to entrust aspects of the public interest to
independent scientific experts, removed from politics, and from outside
the normal civil service framework.’56
A number of initiatives have been undertaken by several institutions,
including the ITU to address this critical problem. One valuable initiative is
54
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the African Green Paper that focuses entirely on the problems of
telecommunications in Africa and offers a comprehensive policy guideline
for countries in Africa to harmonise telecommunications sector policies as a
strategy to develop telecommunications infrastructure and services. There is
also the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology
which prescribes the development of a harmonised regional policy with the
provision of reliable, effective and affordable telecommunications services,
as its central goal. The Protocol specifies actions that will have to be
undertaken to transform the state of the national and regional
telecommunications infrastructures from their present state of under-capacity
to an integrated and advanced info-communications network.
Regional policy on telecommunications becomes even more crucial in this
period of globalisation of the world economy, where telecommunications is
reckoned as both a tradable service and transport of info-communications
services. In this context, the capability of an individual State for effective
delivery of services is not likely to contribute to stronger regional cooperation. Instead there is now unnecessary duplication of structures and
efforts, dissipation of funds from foreign donors directed to improve
individual State’s ICT structures but diverted to other irrelevant programmes
or projects through capture and failure to prioritise. From the beginning two
benefits may be realised.. Firstly, a group of countries combines their
strengths, on one hand, to resist competitive threats and, on the other hand, to
take advantage of the opportunities that emerge in the global market, such as
the transport of international telecommunications or information traffic.
Secondly, the group of SADC countries will present a larger market to
private investors who could find an opportunity to achieve standardisation
and economies of scale, factors that may be decisive in investment decisions.
Finally, the interest of society as a whole must be taken into consideration in
any decision affecting the development of the telecommunications industry.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Establishment, through treaty and protocols of the SADC
Independent Communications Authority (SADC-CA).
B. The personnel should be independent of and not be appointees of
SADC member States governments; neither should the personnel be
drawn from SADC related ministries.
C. SADC-CA will hold quarterly consultative summit meetings with
SADC telecommunications ministries and other relevant bodies, with
a major mandate to develop and adopt Telecommunications Acts and
other ICT related rules and regulations.
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D. All the functions of the already existing telecommunications agencies
under State ministries, and those of existing so-called independent
regulatory agencies would be subsumed under SADC-CA.
E. Funding of SADC-CA will come from contributions made by SADC
member States – from each according to its means in terms of a
certain percentage of a State’s GDP. Consequently all the employees
of SADC are paid from the fund administered exclusively by the
Authority.
F. Foreign ICT aid presently enjoyed by respective individual States,
will in future be directed to the exclusive use of the Authority – to
minimise abuse by political leaders and to avoid stakeholder capture.

8. CONCLUSION
The world is witnessing an upsurge in the use of telecommunications and
information in nearly all aspects of human endeavour. The wireless
revolution and the internet phenomenon have recently changed the way
people live and transact business, and the telecommunications/information
technology industry has taken centre stage in world affairs and will continue
to be so far into the foreseeable future. The WTO has confirmed that the
world telecommunications and information technology industry was worth
US$ One trillion in market capitalization. In Africa, there is however dearth
of telecommunications infrastructure, though the penetration has been
noticeable over the past decade, mostly through the dismantling of State
monopolies, especially the telecommunications State utilities, sustained
without an efficient telecommunications infrastructure. Telecommunications
and information technology present copious opportunities for the creation of
unprecedented wealth for Africa. For Africa to benefit from these
opportunities, it needs to improve services by eradicating misuse of
monopoly powers and inefficient use of public resources, The African States
need also remove policies that fostered and encouraged the dominance of the
public sector in national economies in order to attract modern industries and
business - of course to attract foreign investment. Granted some significant
progress has been made in some countries, though there are challenges on the
way. There is now a general awareness all over the continent of the need for
liberalisation, with some countries moving faster than the others. Some
countries have embraced liberalisation and there have been remarkable
progress, thus encouraging others to move in the same direction. Studies
associate foreign direct investment with economic growth rates, and that
improvements in the telecommunications industry stimulate FDI inflows. The
framework for these reforms is provided for by GATS in terms of its overall
annexures. The telecommunications industry is complex and resource
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intensive and requires massive capital outlays. The industry also demands
highly skilled and technologically endowed personnel. Such skills and capital
are not readily available in Africa. In the SADC region the level of savings is
very low and the dominance of the South African economy and its
multinationals is a cause for fear. The SA’S State's utility, TELKOM, is still
under managed liberalisation. It would be in the interest of the SADC region
to establish through treaties and protocols a regional independent
communications regulatory authority. This will require that SADC member
States relinquish part of their sovereignty and allow their respective
regulatory agencies to be subsumed under the envisaged independent regional
regulatory agency (IRA). This regional IRA will have powers to deal with
excesses designed by multinationals while levelling the playing field, giving
certainty to the markets whilst providing security to investors. The WTO
Reference Paper which is a blueprint for the telecommunications sector can
always be consulted by policy makers when developing future policies, rules
and regulations for an acceptable efficient, effective, transparent regulatory
regime. Highly skilled personnel should be recruited and trained. To avoid
capture by dominant stakeholders all the personnel regulatory agency will not
be accountable to their respective home governments. The regulatory regime
will be in charge of its own funding and finances and will regularly hold
quarterly consultative summit meetings with ministries relevant to the
telecommunications industry.
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